JUVENILE JUSTICE, SULLIVAN, AND GRAHAM:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION WILL
CHANGE THE NEUROSCIENCE DEBATE
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ABSTRACT
Over the past twenty years, neuroscientists have discovered
that brain maturation continues through an individual’s midtwenties. The United States Supreme Court cited this research to
support its abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v.
Simmons. Now the Court is faced with two cases that challenge the
constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment
without parole. Many believe these studies indicate that juveniles
are both less culpable for their actions and more likely to reform;
therefore, life in prison for juveniles is disproportionate, cruel, and
unusual. However, others caution against the use of these studies in
deciding issues of juvenile justice. This iBrief summarizes the cases
currently before the Court, presents the arguments for and against
the use of neuroscience in the juvenile justice debate, and analyzes
the impact these cases will have on the future of neuroscience’s
role in juvenile justice.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Advances in technology since the early 1990s have transformed the
way neuroscientists study the juvenile brain. 2 In the past, scientists studied
the brain through post-mortem examinations, 3 animal studies, and
computational models. 4 Through the relatively new technologies of
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), scientists can study the development of the brain over time
in a noninvasive manner.5 Studies using these imaging technologies have
revealed that the juvenile brain, once thought to be fully developed in early
adolescence, continues to develop in key regions through the teenage years
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and into the early to mid-twenties. 6 In particular, the prefrontal cortex of the
frontal lobe—responsible for executive functions such as impulse control,
reasoning, and judgment—continues to develop through adolescence. 7
Criminal defense attorneys have begun using this research to argue for
lesser sentences for juveniles as compared to adults; such efforts led to the
abolition of the death penalty for juveniles in 2005. 8

I. ROPER V. SIMMONS, SULLIVAN V. FLORIDA AND GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
¶2
Writing for the majority in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Stevens used
neuroimaging research of juvenile brain development to help support the
holding that applying the death penalty to juveniles is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. 9 Justice Stevens found juveniles to be less
culpable than adults for the same crimes because juveniles’ personalities are
still developing, and thus, there is a greater possibility that character
deficiencies will be reformed. 10 The Court held that juveniles’ diminished
culpability weakens the force behind the retribution and deterrence
justifications for punishment. 11 The Court rejected the idea of considering
age on a case by case basis noting that such a practice could lead to the
unfortunate consequence where, “[i]n some cases, a defendant’s youth may
even be counted against him.” 12 While acknowledging the difficulty of line
drawing with categorical rules, the Court nevertheless chose eighteen years
of age as the categorical dividing line between juveniles and adults because
that is where society has often drawn the line.13 Justice Scalia, dissenting in
Roper, argued that the Court’s reliance on scientific studies was faulty.14 He
noted that the studies were never tested in an adversarial setting and the
Court did not know whether the studies were methodologically sound.15

In developments post-Roper, the Supreme Court has heard oral
argument in two cases regarding the constitutionality of juvenile life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (JLWOP): Graham v.
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Florida and Sullivan v. Florida. 16 Graham involves a challenge to a
JLWOP sentence for Terrance Jamar Graham, who was convicted as an
accomplice to an armed burglary and an attempted robbery of a restaurant.17
Graham was sixteen at the time of the crime. Sullivan involves Joe Harris
Sullivan, sentenced to JLWOP for a sexual battery committed when
Sullivan was thirteen years old.18
¶4
Defense attorneys in both cases have relied on psychological and
scientific studies to argue that the reduced culpability of juveniles renders
the JLWOP punishment disproportionate and unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment. 19 Critics of this approach argue that, for a variety of
reasons explored in Part III, neuroimaging studies should not be considered
when deciding the constitutionality of JLWOP. 20
¶5
The Court may: (1) decide to implement a categorical rule, holding
that it is unconstitutional for juveniles under a certain age to receive a
JLWOP sentence, (2) require that judges take age into account on a case by
case basis, or (3) hold that JLWOP sentences are constitutional for both
thirteen year-olds like Sullivan and seventeen year-olds like Graham. The
oral arguments provide some insight into how the Court may resolve the
cases. In both proceedings, Chief Justice Roberts proposed the
individualized, case by case analysis solution, noting “perhaps it makes
sense to consider in a particular instance whether the penalty is
disproportionate, given the juvenile’s characteristics.” 21 Chief Justice
Roberts further noted, “[i]f you go on a case by case basis, there are no linedrawing problems. You just simply say age has to be considered as a matter
of the Eighth Amendment.” 22 The implications that the Court’s potential
outcomes would have on the use of neuroscience in juvenile justice are
explored in Part IV.
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II. THE ARGUMENT THAT NEUROSCIENCE SHOULD INFLUENCE THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
A. The Developing Brain During Adolescence
¶6
Supporters of the use of neuroscience in this debate point to the new
knowledge that neuroscientists have gained from the advent of MRI and
fMRI technology. The MRI “constructs a computerized image of the brain
by measuring the signal strengths of the various radio frequencies emitted
by the proton nuclei of atoms in brain tissue when the protons are placed in
a strong magnetic field. 23 Using MRI technology, scientists have discovered
that the frontal cortex—the part of the brain that controls executive
functions—is the last part of the brain to fully develop. 24 These executive
functions include “impulse control, reasoning, abstract thinking, imagining,
planning behavior, and anticipating consequences.” 25 The frontal lobe
develops through pruning, in which a decrease in gray matter makes cells
more efficient, and an increase of myelin (white matter) around brain cells
increases “the speed and reliability of brain communication.”26

Because the frontal lobe is still developing, juveniles’ brains rely
more on the amygdala, at the base of the brain, when reacting to stressful
stimuli. 27 The amygdala controls behavior related to instinct and survival.28
“Actions controlled by this sector of the brain are characterized as
emotional, impulsive, and often aggressive.” 29 This research indicates that
“novel situations and emotional arousal especially challenge adolescents’
ability to exercise judgment and self-control and contribute to short-sighted,
impulsive decisions and risky behavior.” 30 Scientists have learned this
information through the use of the fMRI, “which essentially amounts to
making a movie of changes in blood flow in the brain as test subjects are
exposed to stimuli or perform various tasks.” 31
¶7
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B. The Argument that Neuroimaging Studies Should Affect the Law
¶8
Many argue that we must use what we have learned from the
advances in technology since the early 1990s in our assessment of what
punishments are proportionate for juvenile offenses.32 Proponents note that
neuroimaging studies, in addition to psychological studies, are “the best,
most sophisticated source of information about how children actually
develop.” 33 Further, neuroscience validates the wealth of psychological
studies on juveniles’ immaturity, thus lending a “hard science” base to a
“soft science” argument. 34 The studies provide scientific data that “simply
reinforces the (once) noncontroversial idea that, as a group, young people
differ from adults in systematic ways directly relevant to their relative
culpability, deterrability, and potential for rehabilitation.” 35
¶9
Proponents of the importance of neuroscience also argue that
juveniles, because of their neurological and psychological limitations, are
less able to participate in the justice process than adults. 36 They are “less
able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consent to searches,
participate in identification procedures, waive Miranda rights, confess,
waive counsel, or enter a guilty plea.”37 They may not be able to understand
judicial proceedings and they may be less able to help their attorney assist
them. 38 Further, neuroscience suggests juveniles are less able to make
important decisions in a “rational and self-protective manner.” 39 These
inabilities could lead to results that our criminal justice system is meant to
avoid, such as false confessions or ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶10
Juvenile advocates also argue, as Justice Stevens acknowledged in
Roper, that the traditional justifications for punishment are weakened by the
scientific evidence rendering juveniles less culpable for their criminal
acts. 40 Science and common sense indicate that juveniles are not as
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blameworthy as adults. 41 Further, and perhaps most importantly, they have a
great potential to reform and rehabilitate as their brains mature and their
personalities develop.42 As with the death penalty, life without parole is less
of a deterrent for juveniles because “the same characteristics that render
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less
susceptible to deterrence.”43 Justice Stevens notes that juveniles are much
less likely to engage in a cost-benefit analysis. 44 Further, Justice Stevens
writes that “[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty
is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.” 45 The same logic
applies to JLWOP, the most severe penalty for any person regardless of age
in some jurisdictions.
¶11
Finally, proponents of the use of neuroscience in the JLWOP debate
argue that, unlike many situations, the science is relatively easy to
incorporate into the law. Unlike many other uses for neuroscience in
criminal law, such as mental retardation, the science here could be applied
accurately to a class without the need for neuroimaging in individual
cases. 46

III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST TURNING TO NEUROSCIENCE
¶12
While many find the arguments for using neuroscience in the
JLWOP debate persuasive, others caution against its use for a number of
reasons. The central criticism involves the quality of the scientific data.
Brain imaging research is “still in its infancy.” 47 When courts rely upon
scientific evidence, there is always a risk of bad or misused data; the
novelty of brain imaging research increases this risk. 48 “[O]ver time, the
high-quality work can be distinguished from the low, and data can be
applied in an increasingly fine-grained way.” 49
¶13
There has been criticism of the studies used by the Court in Roper
and other similar studies. 50 Many of the studies have small sample sizes and
potential sample selection biases.51 Further, there were flaws within the
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studies. In one study, the participants were presented with black and white
images from the 1970s, which may have caused juvenile participants to
react differently than adults independently of their brain development. 52 It
appears that this study, important for the understanding of the amygdala,
was never formally published in a peer-reviewed journal. 53
¶14
One criticism, which repeatedly arises, is that scientists have not
gone far enough to link differences in individual brains to differences in
behavior. 54 Many scientists do not agree that the studies should be used to
guide the Court’s decision in cases like Graham and Sullivan. 55 These
scientists are uncomfortable introducing neuroscience “into the legal system
before it is understood exactly how specific brain traits relate to the real-life
decision making and behavior of teens in high-stress situations.” 56
¶15
Many scientists who understand the weaknesses in the data and
their link to actual behavior are concerned that judges and legislators will
not be able to accurately assess the data.57 In particular, amicus curiae briefs
are not subject to the gate keeping and the normal checks involved with
scientific evidence, including cross-examination of witnesses. 58 There is the
further danger that lawyers, in order to compete in the adversarial process,
will oversimplify the scientific evidence and mislead the judge or justices.59
Due to the limitations on a court, and particularly on the Supreme Court, in
assessing the accuracy of the evidence, some argue that scientific evidence
should only be influential in a juvenile justice debate held in a legislature
rather than a courtroom. 60
¶16
Another argument made by those who oppose the use of
neuroscience research in the Supreme Courts’ decisions is that we must
exercise caution when making direct connections between biology and
criminality. 61 Critics note that “[c]riminal law and neuroscience have been
engaged in an ill-fated and sometimes tragic affair for over two hundred
years.” 62 This concern is further alarming because of the trust people place
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in science. 63 These critics point to the fact that more than biology must be at
play because, despite similar brain development, most juveniles do not
commit heinous crimes. 64
¶17
Proponents of allowing state legislatures to make decisions
regarding JLWOP point out the impracticalities of alternative approaches
when using neuroimaging data. 65 First, the age limit that one must draw
with a categorical rule is very difficult to draw according to the
neuroimaging research.66 Much of the research indicates that brains are
developing into an individual’s mid-twenties. 67 This age range does not
comport with what the law and society have traditionally recognized as the
line between adolescence and adulthood. Further, if individuals are judged
on a case by case basis, perhaps the elderly would be less culpable for their
crimes because their neurons are not as efficient as a middle-aged adult. 68

Perhaps the strongest argument raised by opponents of neuroscience
in the JLWOP debate is that this issue presents a moral and legal question,
not a scientific one. 69 Many would argue that, while the neuroscience may
show that juveniles are less culpable than adults, they are still culpable
enough to be punished with life without parole. 70 “Relative deficiencies do
not necessarily take juveniles below a legal threshold but may instead show
that they exceed it by a lower margin.” 71 This is an argument that Justice
O’Connor made in her dissent in Roper, 72 and it is an argument that may
very well influence the Court in their decisions in Graham v. Florida and
Sullivan v. Florida.
¶18

IV. THE ROLE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
POST-SULLIVAN AND GRAHAM
The effectiveness of using neuroimaging results as an argument for
juvenile justice reform will be greatly affected by how the Supreme Court
rules in Sullivan and Graham. If the Court decides that the sentences are
constitutional in both cases, juvenile advocates will have to attempt to
¶19
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persuade legislatures to make an exception for juveniles under a certain age
or eliminate the penalty altogether. Given the political pressure to be tough
on crime, this would be a difficult task. “It is an unfortunate political reality
that modern crime policy tends to be a one-way ratchet consistently
trending in the direction of more punishment.”73
¶20
If the Supreme Court holds that judges must consider a defendant’s
age in order to comport with the Eighth Amendment, individual defense
attorneys will be left to make the reduced culpability argument based on
neuroimaging in each individual case. While it seems attorneys could be
successful based on the argument above that science is persuasive, the only
systematic review of cases in which this was attempted reveals that it is
actually a rather ineffective strategy. 74 The cases “strongly suggest that
neuroscience does not materially shape legal decision makers’ beliefs and
values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of
those beliefs and values.” 75 This is made more difficult by the idea that the
elements of a crime under the law and the implications of the scientific
findings do not track each other. 76 For example, “intentional mens rea asks
only whether a defendant desired or knew that a result would obtain, while
neuroscientific arguments invite a focus on substantive irrationality
notwithstanding specific intent.”77 This research, while limited to one study,
suggests that presenting neuroimaging research on a case by case basis
approach, as Chief Justice Roberts seemed to advocate in the oral arguments
for Graham and Sullivan, would have little effect on the current state of
juvenile life without parole. 78
¶21
The third path the Supreme Court may choose is to set an age below
which it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment
without parole. This result would be the most favorable for proponents of
incorporating neuroimaging research into juvenile justice. Because the
defense attorneys largely argued the cases based on the neuroscientific and
psychological research, a categorical rule would seem to validate their
arguments. This result would leave open the door for incorporating
additional neuroscientific research into juvenile justice policy in the future.
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CONCLUSION
¶22
The Graham and Sullivan cases currently before the Supreme Court
will likely have a significant impact on the role that neuroimaging
technology plays in making future decisions regarding juvenile justice.
While there are staunch proponents of using neuroscientific research to
determine what punishments are disproportionate for juveniles, there are
also many arguments against it. The Court’s decision will, implicitly if not
explicitly, validate the arguments on one side or the other. If the Court fails
to create a categorical ban on life without parole for juveniles below a
certain age, proponents of incorporating neuroimaging research into the
treatment of juveniles in criminal law will face an uphill battle. If, however,
the Court does choose to implement a categorical ban, the door for
neuroscientific research opened in Roper will remain open for juvenile
advocates to further reform the system in the future.

